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Abstract
This paper holistically addresses the eﬀective (relative) income tax contribution
of a given income (or, wealth) group. The widely acclaimed standard in public policy
is the absolute benefaction of a given income group in filling up the fiscal coﬀers.
Instead, we focus on the ratio of the average income tax rate of an income group
divided by the percentage of national income (or wealth) appropriated by the same
income group. In turn, we develop the Fiscal Inequality Coeﬃcient which compares
the eﬀective percentage income tax payments of pairs of income (or wealth) groups.
Using data for the US, we concentrate on pairs such as the Bottom 90% versus
Top 10%, Bottom 99% versus Top 1%, and Bottom 99.9% versus Top 0.1%. We
conclude that policy makers with a strong social conscience should re-evaluate the
progressivity of the income tax system and make the richest echelons of the income
and wealth distributions pay a fairer and higher tax.
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1 Introduction
Deep-seated and multi-facet challenges on the public finances of advanced economies make
a convincing case to remould the debate for means-tested direct income tax hikes.1 Supply-
side economics that has dominated policy since the beginning of the 1980s advocates
deregulation, the weakening of welfare programmes and tax cuts. At the same time, the
rich are hailed for their contribution in filling up the fiscal coﬀers. This is in line with
textbook public economics which braces the argument that in a progressive income tax
system, it is the top earners that support (through their income tax payments) the wider
society significantly more than any other income group. True may be, but only in an
absolute, dry, sense.
In this paper, we propose a holistic new index which re-evaluates the progressivity of
the income tax system.2 Instead of focusing on merely the absolute income tax contri-
bution, which is the standard practice, we rather concentrate on the ratio of the average
income tax rate per given income group divided by the percentage of national income
owned by the same income group. Our measure of the eﬀective (relative) income tax
contribution is very flexible since in the denominator one can also use the percentage of
the total household wealth appropriated by a reference income group.
Our numerical calculations are carried out for the US using the recent comprehensive
distributional national accounts developed in Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2016). This
unique and laborious dataset is a much needed tool to better monitor economic growth
and its distribution. It is particularly pertinent for our work since our main objective is
to profile our index further as the Fiscal Inequality Coeﬃcient (FIC).
Once the ratio of the eﬀective (relative) income tax contribution is calculated for each
income group alone, the FIC (being free of units of measurement), allows easy comparisons
of the actual benefaction into filling up the fiscal coﬀers of pairs of income (or wealth)
groups. We mainly focus on the Bottom 90% versus the Top 10%, the Bottom 99%
versus the Top 1% and the Bottom 99.9% versus the Top 0.1%.3 There is a voluminous
literature in labour economics regarding the diﬀerential pay of skilled versus unskilled
labour, the impact of new technologies, automation etc. To that end, we further report
1In the aftermath of the 2008-09 Great Recession, fiscal consolidation programmes are implemented in
the rich economies, despite record low interest rate costs for servicing government debt issuance. Recent
data from Thomson Reuters Datastream and the IMF show that the post-crisis fiscal tightening, defined as
the change in structural government balance as percentage points (pp) of GDP between 2010 and 2016,
was for the G7 economies: US, 5.8pp; UK, 4.4pp; France, 3.6pp; Japan, 3.5pp; Germany, 3pp; Italy,
2.5pp; Canada, 2pp. At the same, the escallating costs of (i) health and social care; (ii) unemployment
benefits and other fiscal transfers to the working poor due to the new landscape of automation; (iii)
decreasing labour force participation; (iv) loss of manufacturing jobs; and (v) low-paid, precarious forms
of employment, put a huge strain on a governments’ balance sheet.
2The main theoretical ideas of this work have been previously introduced in Hatgioannides and
Karanassou (2017a).
3Obviously, the FIC can be reported for any chosen pair of income (or wealth) groups.
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the FIC for the Top 10% against the Top 1%, the Top 10% against the Top 0.1% and the
Top 1% against the Top 0.1%; arguably, all highly-skilled income (or wealth) groups have
benefited from the modern labour landscape.
Theoretically, the FIC ranges from the value of one (denoting perfect equality), to
large values approaching, in the limit, infinity (perfect inequality). As such, it could
potentially act as supplementary to the recognised benchmark for inequality, that is, the
Gini coeﬃcient which ranges from 0 (perfect equality), to 100 (perfect inequality).
The standard economic paradigm addresses the "holy trinity" of GDP growth, inflation
and unemployment management. Still on the fringes of main macroeconomic theorizing
and policy making, but recently receiving a great deal of attention and shaping the public
debate, is the heavily skewed income/wealth distribution and the appropriation of the
proceeds of growth by the top percentiles. We feel that inequality is the missing vital
fourth statistic of economic well functioning.
For the last four decades, both the personal and functional income distributions have
followed divergent paths in the US, see Figure 1 below as reported in Karanassou and Sala
(2017). While increasing inequality in personal income distribution has been pushing the
Gini coeﬃcient relentlessly upwards, making the US look like more of a developing than
an advanced country, the evolution in the functional distribution has been characterised
by a downward trend in the labour income share. Since the labour income share can also
be envisaged as the wage-productivity gap, its downward trend is a mere reflection of
wages lagging further behind labour productivity, thus boosting the income of the capital
holders.
Figure 1. Labour income share and income inequality in the US.
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It is self evident that income taxes configure the fiscal revenue space together with
other direct/indirect taxes, insurance contributions and government borrowing. The FIC
points to a much neglected, redistributive function that a trully progressive income (and
wealth) tax should serve in a rich, albeit highly unequal, polarised and divided advanced
economy such as the US.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a bird’s eye view
of why inequality is the missing fourth statistic of economic and social well being. Section
3 provides the workings for the calculation of the FIC and provides empirical evidence for
the US. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Inequality: The Missing Fourth Statistic
The renowned British historian Charles H. McIIwain (1932) noted that "...The idea of
equality of men is the profoundest contribution of the Stoics to political thought...its
greatest influence is in the changed conception of law that in part resulted from it"
(pp. 114-115). In the same vein, the esteemed historian A.J. Carlyle (1903) wrote earlier
"...There is no change in political theory so startling in its completeness as the change
from the theory of Aristotle to the later philosophical view represented by Cicero and
Seneca... We think that this cannot be better exemplified than with regard to the theory
of the equality of human nature" (pp. 8-9).
Positivism in modern economics, nurturing an image of a value-free science in a value-
ladened discipline, is strenuously aiming to separate inequality from its philosophical,
sociological and, most importantly, classical economics heritage. The topic of inequality
was made largely irrelevant for influential parts of the mainstream, destined beyond the
realm of micro founded, scientific economics. Lucas (2004) asserted that "Of the tenden-
cies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most
poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution".
Wisman and Smith (2011) thoroughly and critically review the (i) contributory, (ii)
incentives, (iii) trickle-down, (iv) libertarian, and (v) fluid vertical mobility endeavors
for legitimating inequality in economic and political theorising. They correctly, in our
opinion, argue that "...such approaches to distributive justice have continually provided
a powerful theoretical and political under-girding for those who oppose eﬀorts to reduce
inequality through policy. These approaches even favor policies that serve to increase
inequality, such as tax cuts for the rich and cuts in public goods and social welfare for
the poor" (pp. 995-996).4
4Wisman and Smith (2011) argue that (i) the marginal contributory argument insists that those who
have more in our economy are typically those who contribute more, with the claim that is both natural
and just; (ii) the incentives argument, strongly complements the contributory one, and suggests that
inequality, or even more of it, is necessary for bringing forth behavior that contributes to economic
4
Since the 1980s, the mainstay argument justifying inequality is the marginal contrib-
utory/incentives approach (see footnote 4). It is deeply entwined with the common intel-
lectual roots of libertarian philosophy and neoclassical economics that set the autonomous
individual at the center of the socioeconomic world.
Nozick (1974), perhaps the most influential proponent of libertarian justice, argued
that a distribution of goods is just if brought about by free exchange from a just starting
point, even if large inequalities subsequently emerge from the process. He carried on,
controversially arguing that a consistent upholding of the non-aggression principle would
allow and regard as valid consensual or non-coercive enslavement contracts between adults
in a typical "free system".
In a surprising reversal of his earlier philosophising, Nozick (1989) expressed, through
his methodological ecumenism, serious misgivings about capitalist libertarianism, going
so far as to reject much of the foundations of liberal theory on the grounds that personal
freedom can sometimes only be fully actualised via "...a collectivist politics.... and that
wealth is at times justly redistributed via taxation to protect the freedom of the many
from the potential tyranny of an overly selfish and powerful few" (pp 71).
We are turning our attention next to justifying the redistributive function of taxation.
3 The Fiscal Inequality Coeﬃcient
We proceed with the detailed calculations of the Eﬀective Income Tax contribution and
the FIC.
Assuming a uniform income distribution within a given income group, we define the
Eﬀective (relative) income tax contribution of a representative taxpayer in the income
group as:
Average Income Tax Rate per Income group (%)
Share of Total Pre-Tax Income of the Representative Taxpayer in the income group (%)
(1)
If one further assumes that the  percent of wealth-holders are the same people as the
dynamism; (iii) its trickle-down corollary claims that redistributing income to the rich who will save and
invest it is best for everyone; (iv) the libertarian view asserts that policy measures to reduce inequality
are more unjust than the inequality itself because the former involves the violation of individual rights
and the latter does not; and (v) the fluid vertical mobility argument suggests that inequality is not an
issue since everyone can by dint of dilligence make it to the top.
Wisman and Smith, ibid, articulate a forceful critique of all five aforementioned approaches to legit-
imating inequality by explaining in detail why they are grounded in theoretical constructs that distort
social reality.
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 percent of income holders,5 then a variant of expression (1) reads as:
Average Income Tax Rate per Income/Wealth group (%)
Share of Total Household Wealth of the Representative Taxpayer in the Income/Wealth group (%)
(2)
The FIC is then readily available if one divides expression (1) for pairs of income
groups and/or expression (2) for pairs of wealth groups.
In reporting the FIC, we are typically using in the numerator the more populous income or
wealth group. We are also employing the convention that the "Bottom  percent group"
of the income (wealth) distribution is the numerator of the FIC calculations whereas the
"Top (1− ) percent group" lies in the denominator (in the case that the income (wealth)
brackets of a given pair add up to 100%, or 1.00 of the income (wealth) distribution).6 It
then follows that parity in the fiscal benefaction among income (wealth) groups is attained
when the FIC is equal to one. Values of the FIC bigger than one produce unequal relative
income tax contributions.
As an empirical illustration, we use the unique dataset for the US developed in Piketty
et al. (2016). We adhere to the definition of the relevant variables provided therein.
Figures 2 and 3 below plot the FIC based on income and household wealth shares, respec-
tively, of the Bottom 90% versus the Top 10%, the Bottom 99% versus the Top 1%, and
the Bottom 99.9% versus the Top 0.1% for 1962, 1980, 1995, 2010, and 2014.7 Detailed
calculations are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
5We acknoweledge that this is a very strong assumption with very debatable empirical validity. We
are also aware that total personal wealth is made by both stock and flow variables. However, it is the
income (flow) component of personal wealth that is routinely taxed more than the stock elements, hence
our proxy calculations.
6It should be noted that in the calcualtion of the FIC, the pairs of the income or wealth brackets may
not add up to 100% or the entire area of the distribution curve. (For example, Top 10%/Top 1%)
7As explained in the note to Table A1 in the Appendix, the selection of years for calculating the
FIC is constrained by data availability in Piketty et al. (2016). Nevertheless, it may be considered as
representative of diﬀerent epochs that have signposted the trajectory of alternative economic policies:
60s (Year 1962) —the Keynesian demand led/full employment era; 80s (Year 1980) —the onslaught of the
supply-side economics; 90s (Year1995) —the "roaring goldilock" economy. Year 2010 reflects the depths
of the Great Recession and Year 2014 is representative of the straits of fiscal consolidation.
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Figure 2. Relative income tax contributions of the representative
taxpayer: B90/T10; B99/T1; B99.9/T0.1
(FIC based on income shares)
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Note: see notes under Table A1.
Figure 3. Relative income tax contributions of the representative
taxpayer: B90/T10; B99/T1; B99.9/T0.1
(FIC based on household wealth shares)
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The results are starking. The FIC based on income shares remains relatively constant
for all pairs for years 1962 and 1980 and increases significantly in year 2010, with the
Bottom 99.9% eﬀectively contributing 89.7 times more in the fiscal coﬀers than the Top
0.1%; the aftermath of the Great Recession reduces the FIC to 76.4 for the same pair in
2014, still almost 3 times more than it was in 1980, the birth of supply-side economics.
The results are more eye-dropping if one calculates the FIC based on household wealth
shares. However questionable our assumptions are in using wealth rather than income,
it is very daunting to interpret the evidence that in the year 2010 the Bottom 99.9%
contributed 208.9 times more than the Top 0.1%, nearly four times over than in 1980!
One should accept the premise that the top percentiles of the income and wealth
distributions are populated by highly skilled individuals who are proficient to the new
technologies. Figures 4 and 5 report the FIC based on income shares and household
wealth shares for the Top 10% versus the Top 1%, the Top 10% versus the Top 0.1% and
the Top 1% versus the Top 0.1% for the same years as above. Once again, the detailed
calculations may be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Figure 4. Relative income tax contributions of the representative
taxpayer: T10/T1; T10/T0.1; T1/T0.1
(FIC based on income shares)
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Figure 5. Relative income tax contributions of the representative
taxpayer: T10/T1; T10/T0.1; T1/T0.1
(FIC based on household wealth shares)
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Note: see notes for Table A1.
Whereas the findings for the Top 10% versus the Top 1% and of the Top 1% versus
the Top 0.1% do not diﬀer much over the years and have comparable magnitudes, the Top
10% was eﬀectively paying in the year 2010 19.6 times more than the Top 0.1% based on
the income shares and 25.4 times more based on household wealth shares.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth explanation of the systemic
causes for the escallation of inequality in the advanced economies since the 1980s. We
refer the interested reader to Hatgioannides and Karanassou (2017b).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a flexible new measure called the Fiscal Inequality Coeﬃcient
(FIC) which compares the eﬀective (relative) income tax contribution of diﬀerent income
and, under specific assumptions, wealth pairs of percentile groups. The FIC may be
used in holistically assessing the progressivity of the direct income and can serve as a
supplementary inequality index to the Gini coeﬃcient.
Using the novel distributional national accounts for the US developed by Piketty et
al. (2016), we calculate the FIC for three complementary pairs of income and wealth
percentiles (Bottom 90% versus the Top 10%, Bottom 99% versus the Top 1% and Bottom
9
99.9% versus the Top 0.1%) for a selection of years from the 1960s up to the present. The
FIC reaches its maximum value for all pairs in the midst of the Great Recession, the year
2010, having increased manifold since 1980, the year that supply-side economics took hold
of economic policy in the US.
Using the iluminating lens of the FIC, we further examine as to whether there are
significant diﬀerences between the evidently highly-skilled, familiar with the advent of
new technologies, income and wealth pairs of the Top 10% against the Top 1%, Top 10%
against the Top 0.1% and Top 1% against the Top 0.1%. Again, the highest values of
the FIC are reported for the year 2010 with the pair of the Top 10% versus the Top 0.1%
standing out in terms of unequal contribution into filling up the fiscal coﬀers.
The overarching policy question is the following: In the current era of fiscal consoli-
dation should the rich be taxed more? Our evidence suggests unequivocally yes.
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1. The Fiscal Inequality Coefficient. 1962, 1980, 1995, 2010, 2014. .        
  Bottom 90% Top 10% Bottom 99% Top 1% Bottom 99.9% Top 0.1% 
A Average tax rates by pre-tax income group, percent    
 1962 23.9 33.2 25.5 39.3 26.5 43.6 
 1980 28.7 34.8 29.9 38.5 30.4 40.8 
 1995* 29.7 34.7 - 37.8 - 41.9 
 2010 26.1 30.7 27.4 31.3 27.8 32.4 
  2014 27.6 33.9 29.1 36.4 29.6 39.8 
        
B Shares of total pre-tax income ( equal-split individuals (20+) ), percent   
 1962 63.9 36.1 87.4 12.6 95.6 4.4 
 1980 65.8 34.2 89.3 10.7 96.4 3.6 
 1995* 59.3 40.7 - 15.3 - 5.9 
 2010 54.2 45.8 80.2 19.8 90.5 9.5 
  2014 53.0 47.0 79.8 20.2 90.7 9.3 
        
C Shares of total household wealth ( equal-split individuals (20+) ), percent   
 1962 29.4 70.6 72.0 28.0 90.6 9.4 
 1980 35.9 64.1 77.5 22.5 92.7 7.3 
 1995* 35.0 65.0 - 27.9 - 11.6 
 2010 26.7 73.3 62.4 37.6 80.4 19.6 
  2014 27.8 72.2 62.8 37.2 80.9 19.1 
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... Continuation Table A1.             
  Bottom 90% Top 10% Bottom 99% Top 1% Bottom 99.9% Top 0.1% 
D Number of adults (20+)      
 1962 102,373,597 11,375,052 112,611,147 1,137,502 113,634,879 113,770 
 1980 139,740,040 15,526,767 153,714,085 1,552,722 155,111,490 155,317 
 1995* 166,903,716 18,544,857 - 1,854,486 - 185,449 
 2010 203,118,638 22,569,569 223,431,202 2,257,005 225,462,508 225,699 
  2014 210,996,660 23,444,453 232,096,606 2,344,507 234,206,646 234,467 
        
B / D Denominator of the Fiscal Inequality Coefficient with the share of total pre-tax income  
 1962 0.0000006 0.0000032 0.0000008 0.0000110 0.0000008 0.0000389 
 1980 0.0000005 0.0000022 0.0000006 0.0000069 0.0000006 0.0000229 
 1995* 0.0000004 0.0000022 - 0.0000082 - 0.0000319 
 2010 0.0000003 0.0000020 0.0000004 0.0000088 0.0000004 0.0000420 
  2014 0.0000003 0.0000020 0.0000003 0.0000086 0.0000004 0.0000397 
        
C / D Denominator of the Fiscal Inequality Coefficient with the share of total household wealth  
 1962 0.0000003 0.0000062 0.0000006 0.0000246 0.0000008 0.0000823 
 1980 0.0000003 0.0000041 0.0000005 0.0000145 0.0000006 0.0000468 
 1995* 0.0000002 0.0000035 - 0.0000151 - 0.0000628 
 2010 0.0000001 0.0000032 0.0000003 0.0000166 0.0000004 0.0000869 
  2014 0.0000001 0.0000031 0.0000003 0.0000159 0.0000003 0.0000814 
        
A / (B/D) Fiscal Inequality Coefficient (over denominator with shares of pre-tax income)   
 1962 38,276,222 10,458,486 32,861,702 3,556,011 31,492,404 1,119,844 
 1980 61,014,499 15,769,177 51,379,086 5,613,193 48,919,207 1,780,870 
 1995* 83,652,628 15,830,471 - 4,585,657 - 1,315,268 
 2010 97,770,813 15,128,519 76,427,228 3,566,718 69,141,278 770,802 
  2014 109,779,390 16,931,378 84,597,193 4,228,461 76,499,032 1,001,537 
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... Continuation Table A1.             
  Bottom 90% Top 10% Bottom 99% Top 1% Bottom 99.9% Top 0.1% 
A / (C/D) Fiscal Inequality Coefficient (over denominator with shares of household wealth)   
 1962 83,114,954 5,346,495 39,926,001 1,593,416 33,208,774 529,259 
 1980 111,919,583 8,413,492 59,234,042 2,657,932 50,873,773 872,790 
 1995* 141,844,289 9,902,045 - 2,510,569 - 668,011 
 2010 198,276,415 9,449,797 98,181,191 1,879,671 77,854,215 372,600 
  2014 209,158,995 11,024,828 107,590,750 2,291,950 85,735,694 488,927 
        
[A/(B/D)]/10^6 Normalised Fiscal Inequality Coefficient (based on shares of pre-tax income)   
 1962 38.3 10.5 32.9 3.6 31.5 1.1 
 1980 61.0 15.8 51.4 5.6 48.9 1.8 
 1995* 83.7 15.8 - 4.6 - 1.3 
 2010 97.8 15.1 76.4 3.6 69.1 0.8 
  2014 109.8 16.9 84.6 4.2 76.5 1.0 
        
[A/(C/D)]/10^6 Normalised Fiscal Inequality Coefficient (based on shares of total household wealth)   
 1962 83.1 5.3 39.9 1.6 33.2 0.5 
 1980 111.9 8.4 59.2 2.7 50.9 0.9 
 1995* 141.8 9.9 - 2.5 - 0.7 
 2010 198.3 9.4 98.2 1.9 77.9 0.4 
  2014 209.2 11.0 107.6 2.3 85.7 0.5 
Note: Own calculations based on data from Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2016) and their reported statistics on the distribution of pre-tax national 
income and total household wealth among equal-split adults in the US; the unit is the adult individual (20-year-old and over; income of married 
couples is split into two). 
(*) For 1995, data on the number of adults (20+) and the Bottom 99% and 99.9% shares is not given by Piketty et al. (2016). We compute the 
number of adults as follows. We calculate the divergence (in %) between the working-age population (source: World Development Indicators, 
World Bank) and the number of adults (20+) in 1980 and 2010. We take the average divergence and apply it to 1995 to obtain our extrapolated 
adult population for 1995. Based on this extrapolated population, we compute the FIC for 1995 for the Bottom 90%, the Top 10%, the Top 1% and 
the Top 0.1% whose information for blocks A, B and C is available from Piketty et al. (2016). 
 
